transport vessels of international communication?
Andreas Musolff
Metaphors play a central role in public debates about
the structure of the European Union, both nationally and internationally. Some
metaphors are shared across different languages; however, the "same"
metaphor may have contrasting argumentative functions in different discourse
communities. The article investigates the argumentative potential of ship
journey and convoy metaphors that have been used in the public debates about
Europe in Britain and Germany and relates their main variants to prevalent
attitudes towards the EU integration process in the two countries. The study is
based on a bilingual corpus of British and German media texts from the period
1989-2000, which has been assembled as part of a collaborative project on
"Attitudes towards Europe", funded by the British Council and the
DAAD under the "ARC" programme. The article raises methodological
issues concerning the use of corpus data in metaphor analysis and points out
possibilities for the use of contrastive metaphor analysis in German area
studies and comparative media studies.
1.
Maritime imagery in political discourse
In
early 1999, the Süddeutsche Zeitung
published a commentary on the work of the European Commission, in which the
editor, Johannes Willms, likened the European integration process to a ship journey in so far as European
unity can be seen as a distant, exotic
destination, but in order to reach it you need to apply the prosaic techniques of avoiding dangerous currents and heavy seas:
1)... Bislang war man aus
vielen guten Gründen geneigt, eine hohe Meinung über die Europäische Kommission
zu hegen. Unbeirrt von mancherlei Einreden oder gar der Schelte (...) steuerte
sie ihren Kurs zur Beförderung der europäischen Integration. Ein solches
Unterfangen ähnelt einer Schiffsreise zu fernen, exotisch lockenden Gestaden,
die aber die meiste Zeit ziemlich prosaisch vor allem darin besteht, widrige
Strömungen und hohen Wellengang zu meistern. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 January 1999)
In the
context of allegations of mismanagement and nepotism in the EU Commission, this
simile of EU politics as a ship journey
advanced a defensive argument in favour of the Commission, i.e. that its
difficult work deserved some public recognition (the article went on to argue
that, notwithstanding such recognition, the Commission should be held
responsible for proven cases of mismanagement). Such maritime journey imagery is not infrequent in public discourse and
indeed in everyday language use; it forms part of a whole system of journey/transport metaphors that
pervades our conceptualisation of processes extending over a period of time
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 41-45; 1999: 137-160). In political writing, the maritime journey metaphor has a long-established
tradition of use dating back at least to Aristotle, who in his Politics explained the interdependence
of different kinds of citizens’ contributions to the affairs of state by way of
an analogy with sailors’ work on a ship:
2)... Like the sailor, the citizen is a
member of the community. Now, sailors have different functions. For one of them
is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man (...); and while the
precise definition of each individual’s virtue applies exclusively to him,
there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For
they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation.
Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community
is the common business of them all. (Aristotle 1941: 1180).
Some
media commentators of EU politics seem to have taken a leaf straight from
Aristotle’s classic description. The
Economist, for instance, used the ship
metaphor to draw the following conclusion concerning the Commission President
Jacques Santer’s handling of the nepotism scandal in 1999, especially his
leniency towards one of the chief suspects, commissioner Edith Cresson:
3)... [...] if, as president of the
European Commission, you have a choice between dumping overboard someone like
Mrs Cresson on the one hand, and risking the shipwreck of your whole commission
on the other, you will do better to choose the first of those options.
President Jacques Santer chose the second, to ruinous effect. (The Economist, 20 March 1999).
Here,
the Commission president is pictured as a hapless captain who was not decisive enough to dump a sailor that was not able or willing to contribute towards achieving
the ‘salvation of the community’; consequently, the ship (here: the Commission) was ruined. Just as in examples (1) and
(2), the maritime journey metaphor in
(3) serves an argumentative purpose – here it is used to support the conclusion
that in a political institution, as on a ship, someone must have enough
authority to guarantee that all crew
members contribute to the common objective. The image is thus an essential part of the argument rather than a
mere ‘illustration’: without the analogical application of the common-sense
evaluation of a captain’s actions to Santer’s management of the Commission crisis
the editor’s criticism of Santer would not make much sense.
This
argumentative function of maritime
journey metaphors forms the focus of the following analysis. In particular,
I shall try to relate differences in the use of these metaphors in British and
German public debates to prevalent stereotypical perceptions regarding the EU
in the two discourse communities. The basis of this study is a bilingual corpus
of texts from public debates about the EU in Britain and Germany during the
period 1989-2000, which has been assembled as part of a collaborative project
on ‘Attitudes towards Europe’, conducted at the German Department at the
University of Durham and the Institut für
Deutsche Sprache in Mannheim (cf. the project internet web-site: www.dur.ac.uk/SMEL/depts/german/euro-arc.htm
and Kämper 1999). The metaphor corpus amounts to 550.000 words and contains
some 2100 entries of passages from 28 British and German newspapers and
magazines; it can be accessed at the web-site: www.dur.ac.uk/SMEL/depts/german/Arcindex.htm.
The
imagery of British and German Euro-debates can be grouped broadly into seven
thematic domains: I) general transport;
II) specific modes of travel,
III) geometric and architectural structures, IV) social groupings; V) life,
birth and health, strength and size;
VI) competition, sports and war;
VII) show and theatre
[1]
. With 50 occurrences, ship journey metaphors constitute the second-largest
group of metaphors specifying a particular means of transport (= group II), after train journey metaphors (96 occurrences).
Together with general journey/movement
imagery (= group I; e.g. references to milestones
on the road to EMU, crossroads,
cul-de-sacs, two-speed Europe, slow
and fast lanes towards integration/EMU etc.),
they form one of the main metaphor fields of Euro-debates, accounting for
373 occurrences in the corpus.
The
purpose of the study is to complement and, if necessary, correct the results
of previous case-studies, many of which follow the cognitivist approach to
metaphor analysis as developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson
[2]
. Thus, dynamic and geometric metaphors
as well as construction and architecture
imagery have been analysed in regard to specific international disputes in
European politics (e.g. over Gorbachev’s Common
European House metaphor or the 1994 row between the French, German and
British governments over proposals for a two-tier/circle
structure for the EU) and have been related to general conceptual metaphors,
such as TIME-AS-MOVEMENT and STATE-AS-CONTAINER
[3]
.
However,
these studies were usually based on a small (single-figure) number of examples,
which makes it hard to draw any conclusions about their significance for the
national and international debate. This is unfortunate, as the cognitivist
approach seems to lend itself to the an analysis of the ideological function
of metaphors in political discourse by focusing on their conceptual aspect.
From the cognitivist viewpoint, metaphor is a general thought mechanism that
‘maps’ matching aspects of a conceptual ‘source domain’ onto a ‘target domain’,
thereby depicting an abstract or new notion in terms of more concrete concepts
that are closer to everyday common experience or generally accepted folk-theories.
Based on such primary image schemas, complex metaphorical mappings pervade
our cognitive systems of physical and social orientation and form hierarchies
of ‘entailments’, which provide the framework for higher-order conceptual
inferencing (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 60-73). Contrasts between metaphors
used in national debates on international political issues are thus understood
as reflecting differences of conceptual and ideological patterns in the respective
groups. Chilton and Lakoff (1999: 37) go as far as to assert that metaphors
“structure the ‘discourse’ of foreign policy in the deepest sense – not just
the words used but also the mode of thinking”. Taken to its ultimate conclusion,
this argument would support the view that members of one discourse community
are almost at the mercy of the metaphor systems that dominate their discourse.
If metaphors were indeed powerful enough to structure whole belief systems
and their “entailments”, one might wonder how international communication
was at all possible between nations and cultures that use different metaphors.
As long as we rely on case studies, however, the evidence for or against such
hypotheses remains rather slim. By contrast, corpus-based studies would appear
to provide a broader empirical basis for the comparative study of metaphors
in different discourse communities
[4]
.
2.
The Euro-ship and its crew
A
first look at the sample of maritime imagery shows that they are used widely in
the British and German EU debates alike, and in both their main variants, i.e. single ship metaphors and convoy metaphors. Both variants account
each for 45% of the sample; the remaining 10 percent are made up of singular ship-related metaphors (e.g. references
to EMU as a haven for currencies or phrases such as laying
the keel of European policies),
which will not be considered here further. Most instances of single ship metaphors are based on the
‘Aristotelian’ argument regarding the necessity of collaboration, i.e. the EU
or one of its institutions is depicted as a ship
where all crew members must fulfil their
respective tasks and co-operate under one command if they want to finish the
journey successfully. Whereas in example (3) Jacques Santer was criticised
for not having asserted his authority as captain
of the EU-Commission strongly enough (and in consequence suffering shipwreck), Wim Duisenberg, the first
president of the European Central Bank (ECB), was praised on his appointment as
a trustworthy helmsman on an adventurous journey:
4)... Immerhin ging es bei der
EZB um einen verläßlichen Steuermann auf abenteuerlicher Fahrt. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 May 1998).
Whilst
the notions of authority and hierarchy that come with the role of helmsman or captain can be applied in a more or less straightforward way to
politicians or top functionaries ‘in command’ of organisations such as the EU
Commission or the ECB, they become problematic and controversial if they
concern the EU itself, understood as a union of principally equal, sovereign
states. Thus, when the EU itself is the “target domain” of the ship metaphor,
we find a first set of contrasting quotations from the German and British
samples:
5)... Weil der Tanker EG keinen
Kurs ändert, ohne daß alle Hände das Ruder in dieselbe Richtung drehen, umgibt
Maastricht als Anlaufhafen die Aura der Unabänderlichkeit. Der Vertrag wird
jedoch längst milder interpretiert. [...] Die Erweiterung um vier neue
Mitglieder schließlich wird nicht nur jede europäische Übereilung verhindern,
sondern eher das durchaus nötige Einigungstempo zusätzlich bremsen. (Die Zeit, 15 October 1993).
6)... Welcome
aboard the Euro Titanic
...... Everyone knows that within a
monetary union there can be only one bank rate. [...] Suppose then that one
country [...] needs lower interest rates to avoid sliding into a recession or
slump, but the bankers decide that Germany needs higher rates to cool down a
boom. [...]. Suppose, then, at an election the people elected a parliament
committed to lower interest rates and taxes. What then? Tough luck. That is
what I described as the Euro Titanic
– with no lifeboats. (Lord Tebbit, quoted in The Times, 18 June 1998).
In
example (5), the EU’s principle that any major policy change has to be agreed
by all union members is expressed by the proposition that all hands turn the steering wheel. However, as the further
argumentation shows, this arrangement is criticised as hindering smooth or fast progress of the ship, causing its speed to fall below the
necessary minimum, especially with ever more crew members joining. Whilst this criticism is rather moderate,
focusing mainly on a potential decrease of the EU steamer’s speed, the
scenario presented by the former Conservative party chairman Lord Tebbit in
example (6) is one of impending disaster. It shows the EU steamer as the Titanic, i.e. doomed to go under, as a result of a decision in Germany’s favour
by a group of anonymous bankers; one “other country” (= Britain?) is the
helpless victim, dying through no
fault of its own.
The
political arguments expressed in the two metaphorical scenarios are thus
diametrically opposed: Tebbit sees monetary co-ordination under EMU as a
disastrous policy that might sink the
EU-ship, whereas the Zeit
commentator uses a maritime version of the proverbial saying ‘Zuviele Köche
verderben den Brei’ to express his misgivings about the alleged lack of
co-ordination and loss of speed in
the integration process. The contrast between the two scenarios and the
concomitant arguments is obviously not caused by opposing source domain
structures but has to do with the political evaluation of the target domain
topic, i.e. the issue of political and economic integration.
A
further aspect of the EU’s metaphorical ship
journey that is mentioned frequently is the question of crew membership of individual nations,
or their presence aboard the European
boat:
7)... Die Engländer hängen
außenbords an der Reling des Eurodampfers und wagen weder loszulassen noch sich
ganz an Bord zu schwingen – ein kläglicher Anblick; dabei könnten sie mit auf
der Brücke stehen. (Die Zeit, 16
September 1994)
8)... Fears grow that Germany may miss the
EMU boat. German economic performance may not be able to deliver the Maastricht
criteria by the end of 1997, leaving Luxembourg the only remaining racing
certainty. (The Guardian, 13 January
1996)
9)... Germany took its federalist European
agenda to Oxford last night, where the foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel,
delivered an impassioned plea for Britain to end its ambivalence towards
European integration [...]. “It is better to catch the boat than swim after
it,” he said, opening a centre for the study of European law at Oxford
University. (The Guardian, 18 January
1996)
10). Die Frage, ob die Briten
ins gemeinsame Boot gebracht werden können, muß zunächst offen bleiben. [...]
[sie] ließen keinen Zweifel daran, daß sie auf keinem Gebiet zur Abkehr von den
Spielregeln des klassischen Nationalstaates bereit sind. (Die Welt, 7 October 1996)
Although
the corpus includes British statements about Germany not catching the boat, as in example (8), German criticism of Britain’s
role on (or rather, off) the EU ship
is more frequent and much more colourful and outspoken, as in example (7) with
its portrayal of Britain as hanging over
the ship’s railings and being in danger
of going overboard when it could be standing on the bridge instead. This perception is shared by
pro-European British commentators — for instance, in his book on Britain’s
post-war relations with Europe, This
Blessed Plot, the Guardian
columnist, Hugo Young, applies the missed
boat metaphor twice to Britain’s reluctance to join in the early
preparations for the EEC (Young 1998: 268, 308); and in a variation on this
theme, a Guardian leader portrayed
Britain as having been “a drag anchor in the community, the slowest and the
grouchiest member” (The Guardian, 4
June 1992).
Besides
Britain, the only other country which is criticised for obstructing the ship’s progress in the corpus is Denmark, on
account of its first, negative referendum about the Maastricht treaty in 1992.
The Guardian article quoted above
contemplated that Denmark had “stolen” Britain’s “familiar role” (as the
Community’s drag anchor), and Die Zeit
depicted Denmark as an obstacle in the
shipping channel used by the EC ship,
but even in this context Britain received most of the blame:
11). Noch liegt das dänische
Hindernis in der Fahrrinne. Vor allen Dingen steuert die britische
Maastricht-Debatte in gefährliche Gewässer. Die Briten, die derzeit die
Präsidentschaft innehaben und deren Aufgabe es eigentlich wäre, das
leckgeschlagene Schiff abzudichten, sind tief zerstritten. (Die Zeit, 25 September 1992).
Britain
is criticised not for being a mere obstacle
like Denmark but for failing to fulfil its responsibility to repair and save the European ship.
On the other hand, when German politicians speak about their own country’s duty
for the EU ship, they demand an
increase in the nation’s efforts, because without it the EU would be without
guidance:
12). [...] Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany
yesterday stepped up his mission to entrench the prospects for a federal Europe
[...] In his speech to the Christian Democratic Union’s annual congress, Mr
Kohl made it clear that he regarded the battle to shape the future of the
European Union as a fateful one for Germany [...] “If we don’t act now, the
ship of Europe will be cast adrift”. (The
Guardian, 17 October 1995)
Although
Kohl does not explicitly claim the role of Euro-captain
for his own government or for the German nation, his statement that without
German action, the ship of Europe is in danger rests on the assumption that Germany has a
say, if not a commanding role in determining the EU’s progress. This presupposition of a decisive German contribution also
underlies German criticism of Britain not joining or obstructing the EC/EU
boat, which is more frequent in
the corpus than similar British criticism of Germany (for which there is only
one example, i.e. example (8) quoted above). Neither are there any claims
by British politicians or media that Britain should or could be the EU’s captain — rather they debate about whether
to welcome or bemoan its outsider role
on the EU ship. These findings confirm the general assessment by political
and social scientists that the British public’s attitude towards the EU has
become far more sceptical if not downright hostile over the 1990s in comparison
to prevalent attitudes in Germany
[5]
.
3.
The European convoy
The
asymmetry between German and British uses of maritime journey metaphors is even more marked in the second main
image variant, i.e. that of the EC/EU as a convoy
of ships, with each ship
representing one member state. All ‘original’ occurrences of this variant are
on the German side; British media and politicians only use it in reports of or
comments on German usage. The earliest example in our corpus dates from 1989;
it sets the tone for the later debates:
13). Das Integrationstempo muß
beschleunigt werden, damit die Gemeinschaft unter dem Druck des europäischen
Umwandlungsprozesses nicht auseinanderbricht. Wer den Geleitzug bewußt bremst,
wird abgehängt. Zur Not muß ein Kerneuropa aus elf oder gar zehn
Mitgliedstaaten weiter dem Kurs auf eine Europäische Union folgen. (Die Zeit, 24 November 1989).
Differences of speed among the members of EU convoy are perceived as a problem,
because the slow ships may hinder the
group’s progress and thus endanger
its safety. If they ‘insist’ on going slowly, they will be left behind by the fast ships.
As the following example shows, the German commentators leave little doubt about
the identity of the fast convoy members
but are less specific concerning ships in
the convoy that may be left behind:
14). Der Geleitzug der
Europäischen Union [...] ist auseinandergerissen. Die schnellsten Schiffe,
Deutschland und Frankreich, haben sich das Privileg gesichert, das Ziel
einheitlicher Währung von 1998 an allein anzukreuzen, falls die Mehrheit dazu
1997 nicht bereit ist. [...] Europa, wie es sich nach Maastricht ausnimmt, ist
in ökonomische Spitzengruppe, schwer stampfende Seelenverkäufer, britische
Sonder-Fregatte und eine von Evolutionsklauseln durchfurchte Politische Union
geteilt. (Die Welt, 11 December
1991).
Whilst
this comment on the Maastricht treaty openly states that France and Germany are
the front-runners in the EU convoy, it refers only vaguely to the slow group of potentially doomed ships (“Seelenverkäufer”) and
reserves a special role for the British frigate.
This last image is ambiguous: on the one hand, a frigate, as a typical escort
ship (Oxford Reference Dictionary
1986: 321), could be assumed to be fast,
on the other hand it is set apart from the elite
group of France and Germany. Whatever the precise target referents of the slow ships may be, it is worth noting
that the division of the convoy into
several groups of ships is assumed to be a fait accompli in this quotation from 1991, whereas two years
earlier it had only been the object a warning (cf. example 13).
The
increasingly frequent German uses of the convoy
metaphor during the early 1990s became the focus of British media comments
(interestingly, without any explicit references to Allied convoys in World Wars
I and II). The first such comment in the corpus dates from October 1992, when
the Guardian’s correspondent, David
Gow, quoted Chancellor Kohl’s convoy
reference in a speech to the annual CDU party congress:
15). In an impassioned defence of the
[Maastricht] treaty at the annual congress of his Christian Democratic Union,
Dr Kohl repeatedly warned of the imminent dangers of a rebirth of chauvinistic
nationalism in the West as well as in the East. And, in a pointed intervention
in the British debate over ratification, he declared: ‘We don't want a
two-or-three-speed Europe … but nor do we want a Europe in which the speed of
the slower ship determines the pace of the entire convoy.’ (The Guardian,
28 October 1992).
Gow
reported that Kohl’s aides stressed that “this was not meant as a specific
threat to John Major”; however, the Guardian
journalist still interpreted Kohl’s speech as proof that the Chancellor “laid
claim to the supreme role of leading the European Community in ratifying the
Maastricht treaty” (ibid.). Kohl’s use of the convoy image was thus firmly linked to European leadership
aspirations, if not hegemonial interests. These suspicions did not hinder Kohl
from recycling the metaphor in a letter to the Financial Times, which was meant to boost EU-sympathies. Again, the
German Chancellor insisted:
16). I am against the idea of a
two-or-three-speed Europe. But I would add just as clearly that, in view of the
importance of European Union for us Germans, we cannot accept that the speed of
European integration will be dictated by the slowest ship in the convoy. (Financial Times, 4 January 1993)
Like
the Guardian’s David Gow, the Financial Times editor, Quentin Peel, interpreted
it as an admonition by the (self-appointed) convoy leader to the laggards,
i.e. as “a thinly veiled warning to countries such as Britain and Denmark”
(ibid.).
Given that even
the newspaper that published his text saw it as a “veiled warning”, it might
have become obvious to Kohl that the convoy
image had no reassuring effect but came across as an attempt to bully Britain
into catching up with the fast group of EU countries. However, this
deterred neither the Chancellor nor other members of his government from continuing
to use the convoy scenario
[6]
. During the next big Anglo-German
dispute on EU-policy in September 1994 – triggered by the publication of a
‘discussion paper’ of the governing German Christian Democrat parties, in
which they pleaded for a strengthening of an EU core group of states – British newspapers
again found ample occasion to comment on German convoy statements:
17). A plan put forward by German Christian
Democrats for a two-tier reconstruction of the EU has destabilised European
diplomacy because it dares to suggest that Europe cannot expect to achieve
“ever closer union” if it steams at the speed of the slowest ships in the
convoy. (The Guardian, 7 September
1994).
18). While restating Bonn’s commitment to
integration, Mr Kohl insisted that Germany did not want the “convoy’s speed
dictated by the slowest vessel.” (The
Daily Telegraph, 8 September 1994).
19). [...] dynamic metaphors have been
turned against Britain as it seemed to be dragging its feet. [...] critics
[...], like Helmut Kohl last week, [...] insist that the convoy “cannot move at
the speed of the slowest ship.” (The
Independent, 11 September 1994).
As
these quotations show, British commentators continued to read Kohl’s use of the
convoy image as a warning or as a threat,
e.g. as a suggestion with “destabilising” results, as a condition for Germany’s
official “commitment to integration”, or as an argument “turned against
Britain”. This critical attitude was even adopted by Tory government ministers
in explicit protests against the ‘discriminatory’ use of the convoy metaphor. In 1996, for instance,
the then Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, criticised the “slow boat taunt”
as expressing an anti-British bias (The
Times, 5 February 1996) and a year later, in the run-up to the general
election, the Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, carried his government’s
criticism of Kohl’s metaphor to the lion’s den, i.e. the CDU’s Konrad Adenauer Institut in Bonn:
20). [...] Mr Rifkind was in effect urging
the German to ditch the ideas of their leader. [...] There was no point in
talking about a faster integration which left behind the ‘slowest boats’ in the
convoy: ‘We are not talking about convoys, we are talking about democracy’.
[...] Other Kohl metaphors were also thrown overboard. (The Times, 20 February 1997).
Rifkind,
in a daring attempt to turn the tables in the EU integration debate, which was
most probably aimed more at winning favours with the British Eurosceptic
constituency rather than persuading his audience in Bonn, tried to shift the
blame for the EU division back onto the self-styled convoy leader. By juxtaposing convoy
hierarchy and democracy, Rifkind suggested that using the convoy image amounted to speaking in favour of an undemocratic
Union.
Shortly
after Rifkind’s speech, the Conservative government ship in Britain was sunk,
so to speak, by the election results of May 1997. The German Christian
Democrats’ crew also sailed into troubled waters when a severe recession seemed
to damage Germany’s credentials for meeting the EMU convergence criteria. In
April 1998, shortly before the EU commission deemed Germany and France to have
met the criteria after all, the Süddeutsche
Zeitung warned that both nations might be viewed by the other members of the European convoy as hindering its
progress:
21). Wenn in diesen beiden
Ländern das Wachstum aus strukturellen Gründen nicht so richtig vorankommt,
dann könnte es leicht passieren, daß sie von den anderen Mitgliedern des
europäischen Geleitzugs als Hemmschuh empfunden werden. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 April 1998)
Thus,
the erstwhile convoy avant-garde – cf. example (14) – was
apparently in danger of falling behind
the supposed laggards. This applied
to other areas of EU-policy as well. By the end of 1998, Die Welt praised the British and French governments for having
taken the initiative to intensify military co-operation within the EU. Germany,
now ruled by a coalition government of the Social Democrats and the “Greens”,
was not mentioned among the states promoting this initiative. However, the
newspaper remarked philosophically, it was not necessary that all EU member
states fully participated in the new scheme from the start: those who were
ready should move forward first – the rest of the convoy would surely follow:
22). Was Tony Blair und Jacques
Chirac jetzt skizziert haben, läuft auf ein enges militärisches Zusammengehen
etlicher EU-Staaten hinaus [...] bei europäischen Jahrhundertprojekten [müssen]
immer erst die vorangehen [...], die sich früher bereit fühlen als die anderen.
Der Rest des Konvois folgt dann schon. (Die
Welt, 5 December 1998)
Here, making up the rearguard of the EU convoy
is not even seen as such a bad thing – the readers are reassured that, as long as there are some ships that take
the initiative, all will be well. Germany is apparently no longer seen as
being under the obligation to be part of the head group. This non-elitist
German self-perception seems to have caught on also in government statements.
In March 1999, after his first finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine, had
resigned, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder sought to reassure the other EU member
states that his government would in future fall
in line with the European convoy in matters of finance policy:
23). Zu Beginn seiner Rundreise
durch die Hauptstädte der EU hat Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder erklärt,
Deutschland werde sich auf dem Gebiet der Finanzpolitik künftig ‘im
europäischen Geleitzug bewegen’. (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 16 March 1999)
Little
had remained of the self-confident assumption that Germany occupied a
guaranteed place at the top of the convoy
and could admonish other states to catch
up – now the German government was happy if it just could sail along with and stay in the European convoy.
When
we look at the overall distribution of convoy
imagery in the corpus, the asymmetrical pattern of German and British
perception of nations’ roles that we found for single ship metaphors is even more clearly noticeable. Up until
1998, all uses of the convoy metaphor
in the German sample assume convoy
leadership for Germany either explicitly or implicitly (in the latter case,
tacitly assuming that the German side can admonish slow ships to catch up);
the laggards in the convoy are rarely ‘named and shamed’ but
the pragmatic context leaves little doubt that it is the two EMU ‘opt-out’
nations, Great Britain and Denmark, that are being targeted. This finding is
confirmed by the consistent interpretation of German convoy-quotes as threats or warnings by British media and
politicians. In addition, just as there are no claims at all to ship captaincy on the British side of
the corpus, there are none regarding convoy
leadership either. Since 1998, the German public has started to question
their nation’s role as being one of the EU
convoy leaders; the British sample has no further examples since the row
over the slow boat taunt.
4.
Conclusion
The
stark discrepancies between the German ad British uses of ship and convoy metaphors
can be interpreted as an indication of significant differences of attitude
towards the EU in the both countries. Whereas the German public are strongly
concerned about the EU ship’s or convoy’s
progress (towards EMU or political integration) and – at least until 1998 –
appear to expect that their own country’s role should be that of the captain, helmsman or a convoy leader, the British sample is
dominated by an argument about the rights and wrongs of the (German) perception
of Britain as the laggard or lost crew member or passenger. Some strongly Eurosceptic voices even plead in favour
of Britain not being at all on the EU
ship, which they see as being doomed to go under like the Titanic.
This
asymmetry of the metaphorical roles of Britain and Germany on the EU’s ship journey is repeated throughout the
corpus, especially in the other fields of transport imagery; e.g. depictions
of Germany (together with France) as the locomotive
of the Euro-train vs. Britain as
trying to apply the brakes or jumping off the train; of Germany’s or
the EU Commission’s Mercedes driving
on the autobahn vs. Britain’s car breaking
down in a by-lane, or of Germany moving
ahead at top speed vs. Britain
being on the slow track in a two-speed EU. These stereotypical patterns
of contrastive metaphorical evaluation account for roughly three thirds of
all the occurrences in the respective fields. Although they cannot be interpreted
as being validated – due to imbalances in some of the samples and general
problems in precisely defining metaphor fields
[7]
–, this consistency of asymmetrical
national roles in the British and German samples reflects, and indeed, highlights
the differences in opinions and attitudes.
It is
here where didactic applications of metaphor analysis for both area studies and
media comparison studies may lie. In the first place, some metaphorical
formulations of policy initiatives give rise to high-profile international
debates, which explicitly demonstrate differences or indeed conflicts of
interest and political programmes between governments. The British-German row
over the slow boat accusation, the
dispute over an exclusive core or inner circle within the EU, or the
debate about Gorbachev’s Common European
House are cases in point. They provide official statements as well as a
host of interpretations and reformulations by the media which can help students
to research and compare government and public opinion positions on
international policy issues, e.g. in our case, in Britain and Germany.
Secondly,
the study of public discourse metaphors can complement knowledge about
prevalent attitudes in Britain and Germany towards the EU by providing insights
into the development of specific public discourse agendas. Metaphors are
particularly adaptable to new political constellations, as the swift changes in
German formulations of the convoy
metaphor since 1998 demonstrate: instead of claiming leadership for Germany in
the EU convoy, it became more
relevant for politicians and media to discuss their country’s efforts to catch up with or stay in the European convoy
(there can thus also be no question of imagery ‘determining’ the political
“modes of thinking” of a discourse community). The creative application of
metaphors to new political developments is a characteristic feature of public
discourse, which students should get acquainted with in order to understand the
political bias and ‘spin’ of arguments
in the respective discourse community.
References
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Biodata
Dr
Andreas Musolff is Reader in German at the University of Durham. His research
interests are Comparative Analysis of Public Discourse in Germany and Britain,
Metaphor Theory and German as a Foreign Language. Recent publications
include Krieg gegen die Öffentlichkeit.
Terrorismus und politischer Sprachgebrauch. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag
(1996); Eat your Greens oder: Trenne
Deinen Abfall! Deutsche Umweltdebatten aus der Sicht britischer Studenten und
Medien. In: Elisabeth Kals; Norbert Platz; Rainer Wimmer (eds.) (2000), Emotionen in der Umweltdiskussion. Wiesbaden: Deutscher
Universitätsverlag; and Political Imagery of Europe: a house without exit doors?
Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 21/3 (2000).
[1]
For an overview over all seven
domains in the corpus cf. Musolff (in press).
[2]
Cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980)
and (1999), Lakoff (1987, 1993, 1996).
[3]
Cf. Chilton & Lakoff (1999);
Musolff (1996, 1997); Reeves (1996); Schäffner (1993, 1996).
[4]
For general methodological issues
of corpus-based approaches in metaphor analysis cf. Deignan 1999: 180-199;
Charteris-Black 2000: 155-163.
[5]
Cf. e.g. Baker & Seawright
(1998); Grosser (1998); Schoch (1992).
[6]
For similar statements by foreign
minister Klaus Kinkel cf. e.g. Die
Zeit, 9 September 1994 and 10 March 1995.
[7]
For discussions of this fundamental
problem of applied metaphor analysis cf. Peil (1993) and Low (1999).